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Mind The (Information) Gap:  
Strategic Non-Disclosure by Marketers and Interventions to Increase Consumer Deliberation 
 
Abstract 
Marketers have a choice of what to tell consumers and consumers must consider what they 
are told or not told. Across six experiments, we show that consumers fail to differentiate 
between deliberate and non-deliberate missing information (strategic naiveté) and make 
generous inferences when they do notice missing information is deliberately withheld 
(charitability). We also show how marketers can take advantage of this by withholding 
information. We investigate both sides to (1) show the effects of interventions to encourage 
consumers to consider deliberate nondisclosure in a less naïve and charitable fashion, (2) 
demonstrate when marketers should disclose (or not) if consumers are naïve and charitable 
(i.e., breakeven points), and (3) explore the reasons marketers give for (non-) disclosure and 
consumers’ thoughts on why information is missing. Consumers respond differently to 
distinct but theoretically equivalent framings that increase the salience of non-disclosure. 
Only when non-disclosure was highly salient, and consumers could compare multiple profiles 
side-by-side did consumers believe the nondisclosed information to be the worst possible.  
 
Public significance statement: Marketers often deliberately withhold relevant information 
from consumers about the quality of a product or service they are providing. Across six 
experiments, we show that consumers fail to realize that the information was deliberately 
withheld, and even when they do realize it, they react negatively only when the missing 
information is highlighted as deliberately withheld. When disclosure of information is 
deemed an important policy goal, voluntary disclosure is unlikely to be an adequate substitute 
for mandatory disclosure. 
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Imagine a surgeon choosing to display information about herself, including her patient 
mortality rates, on her online profile. Should she reveal these mortality rates, or should she 
withhold them? Now, imagine the same scenario from the perspective of the patient who 
reads the physician’s profile, and finds the mortality rate information missing. What will the 
patient infer about the mortality rates?  
The patient’s challenge of interpreting missing information is characteristic of many 
situations in which a consumer must evaluate a situation without some potentially relevant 
information. The challenge is made greater because the interpretation depends on why the 
information is absent. There are two broad classes of missing information, which we call 
“deliberate” or “non-deliberate.” Deliberate missing information is when the provider 
actively withholds information because he does not want you to have it, and non-deliberate is 
otherwise (perhaps due to an accident, oversight or technical issue). Usually non-deliberate 
missing information does not justify the same interpretation as deliberate missing 
information. If you are evaluating a CV and accidently spill a bottle of ink on it, you should 
not infer the information concealed by the spillage was particularly bad or good. On the other 
hand, if the applicant had deliberately spilled the ink just before you read an important 
passage, you might suspect that the applicant did not want you to see the missing information 
and you can therefore infer the information is probably bad. 
In this paper, we focus on cases of deliberate non-disclosure, in which information 
providers or marketers intentionally fail to disclose information that they possess and might 
be relevant to their consumers. Such situations are commonplace. For example, when buying 
a car, going to a restaurant, deciding on a movie, or finding a doctor, you will be presented 
with selected information about product features or service characteristics. In these situations, 
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we investigate whether consumers notice when information is withheld, and the inferences 
they make when they do notice, or when their attention is drawn to withheld information.   
We document the effects of recipients not differentiating between deliberate and non-
deliberate missing information (an effect we call “strategic naïveté”) and of making generous 
inferences when they do notice missing information is deliberately withheld (an effect we call 
“charitability”). We investigate the strategic behavior of both information providers and 
recipients and (1) demonstrate interventions that can help recipients notice and make more 
skeptical inferences about deliberate non-disclosure, (2) identify when providers should 
withhold information to obtain the most favorable response from recipients (i.e., the 
“breakeven point” for providers to disclose), and (3) describe the reasons providers give for 
(non) disclosure and recipients give for why they believe information is missing. The 
interventions we examine include different framings of deliberate non-disclosure, 
perspective-taking, and comparative processing. These interventions moderate recipients’ 
reactions to deliberate non-disclosure.  
Interpretation of Missing Information 
Our focus is on two important research problems. First, how do providers decide 
whether to disclose what they know? Second, how do recipients respond to deliberate non-
disclosure?  
The decision of providers to disclose and the decision by recipients of how to respond 
are made sequentially, and both depend on the other. The information provider decides first 
whether to disclose, but their decision will (or should) depend on what they anticipate the 
recipient will do. For example, a marketer chooses how to describe a product before 
consumers decide whether to buy it. But the marketer chooses their description based on how 
they expect consumers will respond. In this sense, therefore, the anticipated response of the 
recipient is logically prior to the actions of the provider. For example, imagine a student who 
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has deliberately chosen to disclose three grades out of a possible four, each of which are on a 
five-point ABCDF scale. She reports the set {A, A, B}, leaving another grade X undisclosed. 
How will a recipient (perhaps a potential employer or professor) evaluate this student?   
There are numerous possible responses. One extreme response is the maximum 
skepticism predicted by a normative game theory analysis that assumes “strategic rationality” 
– that is, unlimited and perfect strategic reasoning on both sides, including perfect strategic 
reasoning about the perfect strategic reasoning of the other side (Mariotti, 1995; Selten, 
1988). Game theory predicts a process often referred to as information unraveling, which is 
that the recipient will infer that the provider’s performance on any undisclosed attributes is 
the worst possible (Grossman, 1981; Grossman & Hart, 1983; Milgrom, 1981; Peppet, 2011; 
Viscusi, 1978). This means the student’s true profile will be estimated as {A,A,B,F}. This 
occurs because all providers except those with the worst performance will want to avoid 
being pooled (or “confused”) with those having poorer performance than them. In other 
words, if the student’s last grade was an A, she presumably would have disclosed it to avoid 
recipients believing she may not have an A. What about a B? If the student was sure to 
disclose an A, then a B is the best of all the grades that remain undisclosed, so the argument 
to disclose an A also leads her to disclose a B. By the same argument, if she has a C (or even 
a D) grade she will also disclose because, if she doesn’t, the recipient will infer she has the 
worst possible grade of F. The iterative nature of this process is known as the “unraveling” of 
information.  
The prediction of unraveling and full disclosure is built on several assumptions: (a) 
the provider possesses the information and cannot credibly misrepresent it; (b) disclosure is 
costless for the provider; (c) on each dimension, ranks can be defined unambiguously so that 
all recipients agree what constitutes high and low quality; (d) the range of possible quality 
values is known to both the provider and recipients, and (e) conditions (a) through (d) are 
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common knowledge. These conditions are likely to prevail in many familiar contexts, but not 
all.  
Thus, by changing some assumptions, the game theory analysis can allow more 
moderate predictions than {A,A,B,F}. For instance, a student might not provide complete 
transcripts because they are costly to obtain (a violation of b). If a potential employer is 
aware of this cost, they might attribute absent transcripts to an inability to bear this cost. Non-
disclosure will also not be judged as harshly if (for example) grades of C, D and F are 
considered equally bad (a violation of c), since then the non-disclosed grade could be as high 
as a C (for more on this topic, see Dranove & Jin, 2010, and references therein).   
Another extreme response is the maximally myopic response which effectively 
ignores any missing information (Simmons & Lynch, 1991), and so treats the provider as 
someone who has provided all the relevant facts. The recipient would therefore treat the 
student as if she had taken only three courses for which she received {A,A,B}. This response 
captures the essence of  Kahneman’s (2011) phrase, “what you see is all there is.”  
Intermediate cases occur when the relevance of missing information is recognized, but 
the missing information is treated as if it were not deliberately withheld. One possibility is 
that the recipient estimates what a typical student who has two As and a B would likely 
receive as a fourth grade, perhaps considering an average of these grades or using the most 
frequent observation as the most likely missing grade (c.f., Garcia-Retamero & Rieskamp, 
2009). Another intermediate response is to treat the three grades as a sample from a 
population who all report their three highest grades (limited information may be deliberate to 
not overwhelm recipients with too much information). The missing grade would then be no 
higher than the lowest of the three reported, with the specific prediction depending on the 
recipient’s understanding of how grades are distributed.  
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Of course, these are not the only ways a recipient might respond to undisclosed 
information, but the range of easily-imaginable responses demonstrates that even a highly 
sophisticated information provider is faced with a complex challenge. The success of her 
disclosure policy will depend on how well she predicts the response of the recipient to her 
policy. A sophisticated provider will choose a disclosure strategy to induce the recipient to 
evaluate her in the best possible light.   
Empirical Evidence  
Although a variety of responses to missing information have been documented and 
explored empirically and analytically (Garcia-Retamero & Rieskamp, 2009), there is as yet 
no systematic investigation of how recipients and providers make decisions concerning 
deliberate non-disclosure. Some experimental studies have either focused on non-deliberate 
non-disclosure, or else subsumed both deliberate and non-deliberate missing information into 
a single category (Hernandez, Han, & Kardes, 2014; Kardes, Posavac, & Cronley, 2004) and 
looked at the inferences consumers make from such missing information (Johnson & Levin, 
1985; Ross Jr & Creyer, 1992; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, & Herr, 1992; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, 
Houghton, Ho, & Posavac, 2003; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, Posavac, & Houghton, 1997; 
Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, & Sansone, 1991; Simmons & Lynch, 1991). Our focus in this paper 
is on decisions made by recipients and providers when information is deliberately withheld. 
We contribute to this literature while focusing on the interlinked interpretation and decisions 
of recipients and providers. We explore differing interventions to make recipients more 
strategic and we also document providers’ reasons for disclosing (or not disclosing) as well as 
recipients’ thoughts regarding the missing information.   
In the “outside world,” missing information is commonly withheld deliberately. Much 
of the field literature reveals that providers given a chance do not usually disclose to the level 
predicted by skeptical game theorists. For example, Mathios (2000) studied whether salad 
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dressings disclosed their fat content and found that while low fat dressings (under 6 grams 
per serving) almost always disclosed, only 60% of those with intermediate fat content, and 
20% of those with high fat content did. Similarly, Carrillo, Cellini, and Green (2013) found 
that homeowners are highly selective about reporting the quality of local schools, and that 
disclosure increases with school quality. And Butler and Read (2017) show that hotels are 
less likely to disclose their TripAdvisor ratings if the ratings are low. 
Also contrary to the strong game theory predictions, when disclosure was voluntary, 
marketers responded in ways suggesting they do not believe consumers are fully strategic. 
For example, Jin and Leslie (2003) studied the effect of a new hygiene rating scheme for 
restaurants. Because of varying legislation, displaying the rating was obligatory in one county 
but voluntary in another. Restaurants in both counties improved their hygiene relative to the 
pre-rating era, but those who were obliged to disclose improved more. Those not obliged 
acted as if they expected consumers to not engage in the full unraveling reasoning process or 
else to be “charitable” about withheld information. It is noteworthy that an obligation to 
disclose led to improved performance, a finding that has recently been replicated in the 
laboratory for both mandatory and voluntary disclosure (Sah & Loewenstein, 2014).   
 Brown, Camerer, and Lovallo (2012, 2013) describe a similar case. Film studios 
often release movies they expect to receive poor reviews on without offering reviewers a pre-
release screening (that is, without disclosing the movie’s quality). Moviegoers who 
apparently give insufficient weight to the implications of non-disclosure initially attend these 
movies in higher numbers than they would have if the movies had actually received a poor 
review. A lack of full unraveling has also been documented in other domains, including 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) (Jin, 2005) and business-school rankings (Luca & 
Smith, 2015). These and other field studies (Fung, Graham, & Weil, 2007) show that people 
do not always infer the worst and tend to be strategically naïve and/or charitable.  
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Under some circumstances, recipients do act more like maximally skeptical game 
theorists. Forsythe, Isaac, & Palfrey (1989) conducted a multi-round asset-bidding 
experiment in which providers could choose to reveal the quality of the product they were 
selling. Consumers did not initially assume the worst from undisclosed information, but after 
several rounds they did. By contrast, Jin, Luca, and Martin (2015) conducted a series of 
multi-round experiments and did not find evidence of full unraveling. John, Barasz, and 
Norton (2016) found that, in a laboratory setting, people did assume the worst about 
individuals who selected “choose not to answer” when asked to disclose personally sensitive 
information (e.g., whether they had ever cheated on a tax return, the lowest grade they had 
ever received). Thus, a range of responses to undisclosed information has been documented, 
from the extremes of complete unraveling observed by John et al. (2016) to the very low 
level of unraveling described by Brown et al. (2012, 2013).  
Strategic Naiveté and Charitability 
The distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate missing information is 
sometimes subtle, but always important. As mentioned, prior research has documented some 
insensitivity to non-deliberate missing information. That is, when information is removed 
randomly or there is no reason to assume it was withheld for reasons of concealment. For 
example, papers on omission neglect sometimes subsume both deliberate and non-deliberate 
non-disclosure into a single category (Hernandez et al., 2014; Kardes et al., 2004). Our work 
is relevant to omission neglect, but we focus on deliberately withheld information. Only 
deliberate non-disclosure requires strategic analysis from the recipient. Therefore, we focus 
on contexts in which the provider wants to sell something to the recipient, such as a product 
or service. In these situations, providers are likely to have deliberated on what information to 
withhold or not. 
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We predict, however, that recipients will often not differentiate between the deliberate 
and non-deliberate absence of information, and providers will often not consider the 
responses of recipients to missing information when deciding whether to disclose or not. Our 
analysis is related to the concept of “Level-k” thinking (e.g., Camerer & Johnson, 2004; 
Nagel, 1995; Stahl II & Wilson, 1994), a key concept in modern game theory. The core idea 
is that strategic actors form a heterogeneous population that differ in their depth of strategic 
reasoning. Some are entirely naïve, displaying what is often called “Level-0” reasoning, and 
do not consider the decisions of others when making strategic choices. For instance, in our 
setting, recipients might fail to consider why information is missing, or providers might fail 
to consider the recipient’s response to missing information. Others may consider the reasons 
for the nondisclosure decisions of others, but they do not complete the unraveling process or 
they conduct relatively innocuous attributions. For example, Benndorf, Kübler & Normann 
(2017) show, in a labor market context in which workers can reveal their level of 
productivity, that very few workers and employers undertake complete unraveling. As 
Benndorf (2018, p. 23) puts it, “Workers are generally reluctant to disclose their private 
information, and employers enforce this behavior by bidding less competitively if workers 
reveal compared to the case where they conceal information.”  
The problem of interpreting deliberate non-disclosure is strategically complex. First 
recipients must recognize information is missing. Next, recipients must both recognize that 
missing information has been deliberately withheld and then infer what the missing 
information is likely to be based on considerations of why that information was withheld. We 
anticipated that unless the reason for information non-disclosure is made salient, recipients 
would fail to infer that information was absent because the provider deliberately withheld it.  
H1a: Strategic naiveté: Consumers will not differentiate between deliberate and non-
deliberate non-disclosure unless missing information is made salient. 
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Furthermore, when the deliberateness of non-disclosure is made salient, we anticipate 
that merely knowing that information was deliberately withheld is insufficient for recipients 
to infer the worst about it. Rather, they will display something analogous to “Level-1” 
reasoning (Camerer & Johnson, 2004), in which they respond partially to the missing 
information, but will not conduct the full strategic game theoretic analysis.  
H1b: Charitability: Consumers will be charitable towards deliberately missing 
information. 
It should be noted that if providers are frugal about providing information then 
consumers will not necessarily be wrong in their inferences that a non-disclosing provider is 
not the worst possible. We return to this point in Experiments 5 and 6 and in the General 
Discussion. 
Interventions to Increase Consumer Deliberation 
Given that consumers are likely to be strategically naive and charitable towards 
deliberate non-disclosure, can we encourage more strategic thinking? We investigate 
different interventions aimed at encouraging consumers to make more strategic inferences 
about missing information. We show the effect of several choice architecture interventions 
that attempt to make deliberate non-disclosure more salient. These involve different framings 
of non-disclosure, perspective-taking interventions that prompt consumers to deliberate more 
about the reasons for missing information, and comparative processing strategies that enable 
consumers to compare information from multiple providers, only some of whom disclose. We 
expected that although some of these interventions would encourage deeper strategic 
thinking, consumers would never reach full unraveling and would therefore not overturn the 
predictions of H1b. However, if most people think only one step ahead (as suggested by 
Camerer & Johnson, 2004), then an extra step of deduction may improve decision-making. 
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H2: Interventions such as different framings of deliberate non-disclosure, perspective-
taking and comparative processing will moderate consumers’ reactions to missing 
information and lead to partial unraveling. 
Providers’ Disclosure Decisions 
We propose that non-strategic thinking will not only be confined to consumers but 
will also be found in the thinking of providers. We predicted that providers would typically 
not consider the possibility of strategic thinking by consumers. Providers would therefore 
base their disclosure decisions on the principle of withholding information they don’t want 
consumers to know, rather than on the inferences consumers could make if they withhold 
information.  
H3: Strategic naiveté: Providers will not base their disclosure decisions on what 
consumers would infer from the absence of deliberately withheld information.  
We therefore anticipated “strategic failures” on the part of both providers and 
consumers in response to deliberate non-disclosure: providers would disclose less that they 
should according to strategic rationality and consumers would treat non-disclosures less 
skeptically than game theory would predict. To test these predictions, we examine both 
providers and consumers and estimate a “breakeven point” above which it is beneficial for 
providers to disclose, and below which it is beneficial for them to conceal information. We 
find that contrary to the strong predictions of game theory, providers should withhold quite a 
bit of information and that a “Level-0” provider is likely to be much better off than a “Level-
0” consumer.  
Overview of Experiments 
 We conducted six experiments exploring decisions by recipients (Experiments 1 to 4) 
and providers (Experiments 5 and 6). We embedded the problem in a medical context. This 
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domain provides an apt context to test our hypotheses for several reasons. The primary reason 
is that the physician-patient domain is a high-stakes setting that is familiar and accessible to 
almost everyone. In addition, online physician profiles are increasing in use all over the 
world, both for advertising and quality control even if little is known about how consumers 
assess them (Hanauer, Zheng, Singer, Gebremariam, & Davis, 2014). There is also an 
ongoing debate concerning whether physicians should have the option of withholding 
information and, if so, whether they are likely to do so if they believe it is in their best 
interest (Gray, 2013; Jones, Gabe, & Exworthy, 2013). Finally, debates over physician 
trustworthiness are becoming increasingly important to physicians, regulators, and patients 
(Grande, Shea, & Armstrong, 2012; Rose et al., 2019; Sah, 2012; Thom, Kravitz, Bell, 
Krupat, & Azari, 2002).  
In Experiment 1, we examine whether participants distinguish between non-deliberate 
non-disclosure (when information is randomly withheld) and deliberate non-disclosure (when 
information is actively withheld). We also conduct our first test of a different framing for 
deliberate non-disclosure to increase the salience of non-disclosure and decrease the strategic 
naiveté and charitability of consumers. In Experiment 2, we use a greater range of framings 
of deliberate non-disclosure as well as asking participants to explicitly reflect on the missing 
information. Experiment 2 also allows us to estimate a breakeven point above which it is 
beneficial for providers to disclose, and below which it is beneficial for them to conceal 
information. Experiment 3 examines whether perspective-taking (i.e., consumers considering 
why providers did not disclose information) decreases naiveté and charitability. Experiment 4 
tests consumers’ reactions to salient non-disclosure and the comparison of multiple profiles. 
Experiments 5 and 6 focus on the provider, asking what decisions the provider will make and 
searching for evidence of strategic thinking to better understand the reasoning behind 
deliberate non-disclosures.  
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In all experiments we report results from all participants recruited, experimental 
conditions, and measures. We based our sample size decisions on personal views about 
“adequate” sample sizes (100 or more), opportunity and budget. All analyses were conducted 
only after data collection for that experiment was completed. Data and materials are available 
at https://osf.io/g9hpf. Our study received ethics (Institutional review board) committee 
approval.  
 
Experiment 1: Comparing Deliberate and Non-Deliberate Missing Information 
In this experiment, we investigated whether recipients would distinguish between 
randomly missing and deliberately not-provided information. We predicted they would not 
(strategic naiveté, H1a). We also tested whether increasing the salience of non-disclosure 
deliberateness would increase its impact (H2). We predicted that even with more salient non-
disclosure, consumers would interpret withheld information in a more positive light than 
predicted by unraveling theory (charitability, H1b).  
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Method 
Participants and design. Participants from Mechanical Turk1 (N = 493; 173 women, 
320 men; Mage = 29.7, SD = 9.2) were randomly assigned into one of three conditions: 
Random, Not Provided, and Refused.2  
Procedure. Participants role-played patients searching for a doctor online (see Figure 
1). They were informed that all doctors in a major U.S. city received patient ratings from 0 
(extremely poor) to 100 (outstanding) on the five dimensions of quality of care, 
trustworthiness, availability, bedside manner, and value for money. For each dimension, we 
displayed the average combined ratings for all doctors in the city. These average ratings 
ranged from 78 to 85. Participants were next informed they would see only four of the five 
ratings received by a certain Dr. Y. We varied which dimension was missing and how its 
absence was explained. In the Random condition participants were informed that “we 
randomly removed” the rating; in the Not Provided condition they were informed that “Dr. Y 
did not provide” the rating; and in the Refused condition that “Dr. Y refused to provide” it. 
Note that the Refused condition was a more salient version of the Not Provided condition, but 
both conditions represent deliberate non-disclosure.   
                                                 
1 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is an online labor system that allows researchers to 
conduct online experiments with a sample more diverse than undergraduate students; (see 
Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2012; Rand, 2012). In all experiments using MTurk in this 
paper, we included attention filters that participants had to pass before being allowed to start 
the study as well as a question of commitment “Sometimes survey participants skip the 
instructions and rush through, which ruins our results. Are you willing to actually read the 
instructions on the next page?” Participants had to confirm “Yes” before starting the study. 
We also included at least one attention filter during the study itself which all participants 
passed unless noted.     
2 Six participants had response time durations 3 standard deviations (SD) above the mean. 
Removing those participants do not change the pattern or significance of the results.   
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Participants estimated the missing rating and then answered questions about Dr Y.  
First, “Do you think Dr. Y is likely to be better or worse than the average doctor on the 
missing dimension?” answered on a 7-point scale from very much worse (1) to very much 
better (7). Next, they assessed Dr. Y’s competence, credibility and integrity on separate 7-
point scales. We averaged these three ratings to give an overall measure of Dr. Y’s quality 
(Cronbach’s α = .90).  
Results 
Estimate of the missing rating. Estimates varied significantly among the three 
conditions, F(2, 490) = 38.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .14 (Figure 2). Supporting H1a, in the Random 
condition, the mean estimate was 77.02 (SD = 5.26), which was not significantly higher than 
that in the Not Provided condition, (M = 75.94; SD = 6.06), t(490) = 1.31, p = .19. Displaying 
strategic naiveté, consumers did not distinguish between non-deliberate (random) and 
deliberate non-disclosure (H1a). The more salient non-disclosure in the Refused condition 
did, however, produce significantly lower estimates (M = 70.36; SD = 10.02) than the Not 
Provided condition, t(490) = 6.80, p < .001, despite both framings representing deliberate 
non-disclosure.  
The standard deviation for the estimate of the missing dimension in the Refused 
condition (10.20) was significantly larger than in the Not Provided (6.06) and the Random 
conditions (5.26); Levene’s test of equality of error variances, F(2, 490) = 20.34, p < .001. 
However, the violation of the assumption needed to conduct analysis of variance was not 
great (the standard deviations differed by less than double the smallest standard deviation) 
and thus statisticians typically recommend univariate analysis will still be robust and reliable 
(Glass, Peckham, & Sanders, 1972). However, we also conducted non-parametric tests (the 
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Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test), which revealed a similar pattern of results.3 A 
larger variance in the Refused condition is consistent with the possibility that responses in this 
condition represents a mixture of people who ignore the implications of deliberate non-
disclosure and those who respond to it. 
For the five dimensions, all but one (availability) displayed the same significant 
pattern as reported for the aggregate of the missing dimensions (eFigure 1), all ps ≤ .001. The 
availability dimension did not differ significantly between conditions, F(2, 95) = 1.18, p = 
.31, ηp2 = .02. The largest difference between the Refused condition and the other two 
conditions was seen for the trustworthiness dimension, F(2, 96) = 16.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .26. 
Some dimensions are therefore more heavily weighted if missing (e.g., trustworthiness) than 
others (e.g., availability). This is interesting, since one critical assumption of the unraveling 
prediction is that all consumers agree what constitutes high and low quality. While 
trustworthiness is a distinct unambiguous concept to most patients, the physician’s 
availability may be a dimension that does not mean the same thing to everybody. That is, 
while everyone will generally want the physician to be available to them personally, they 
may also want the physician to be in demand.4  
Dr. Y: Better or worse than average? Judgments of whether Dr. Y was better or 
worse than the average doctor on the missing dimension showed the same pattern as 
estimates of the missing dimension. In fact, these judgements were significantly correlated 
                                                 
3 Similarly, for other experiments reported in this manuscript, the Independent-Samples 
Kruskal-Wallis Test was conducted whenever there was a violation of equal variances. 
Again, the violations were not strong and similar patterns of results were obtained with the 
non-parametric analyses.  
4 For example, imagine a nightclub that has to disclose the average length of the queue. For 
some people a short queue would be desirable since it will let them get in easily; for others a 
long queue is better because it means the nightclub is popular.  
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with how far the participants’ estimate of the missing dimension was from the average rating 
of all doctors, r = .48, p < .001.   
The three conditions differed significantly, F(2, 490) = 15.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. 
Ratings in the Random and Not Provided conditions did not differ (respectively, M = 3.84, 
SD=.85; M = 3.70, SD = .87; t(490) = 1.38, p = .17), again providing support for the 
hypothesis that consumers do not distinguish between deliberate and non-deliberate 
nondisclosure (H1a). However, different framings of deliberate non-disclosure had an effect 
(H2): ratings of the doctor were substantially lower in the Refused condition (M = 3.31, SD = 
1.02) than in the Not Provided condition, t(490) = 3.96, p < .001.  
Further, in both the Not Provided and Refused conditions, consumers were charitable 
(H1b)—i.e., they did not rate Dr. Y to be very much worse than the average doctor (1 on the 
7-point scale) on the missing dimension (for Not Provided, t(161) = 39.57, p < .001; for 
Refused, t(169) = 29.62, p < .001). However, the mean in all conditions was below the mid-
point of the scale (4), all ps < .02, suggesting that participants rated Dr. Y worse than the 
average doctor on the missing dimension.  
Dr. Y’s quality. A similar pattern was seen with the assessments of competence, 
credibility and integrity (averaged) across the three conditions, F(2, 490) = 20.79, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .08. The Random and Not Provided conditions did not differ (respectively, M = 5.10, 
SD = .95; M = 5.11, SD =.95; t(490) = .03, p = .98), providing further support for H1a. 
However, the Refused condition was significantly lower (M = 4.48, SD = 1.17) than the Not 
Provided condition, t(490) = 5.58, p < .001 (H2). In both deliberate non-disclosure 
conditions, consumers were charitable (H1b) and did not assume the worst about Doctor Y’s 
quality, (for Not Provided, t(161) = 55.03, p < .001; for Refused, t(169) = 38.82, p < .001).  
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Discussion 
As predicted by H1a, consumers displayed strategic naiveté in that evaluations did not 
differ between information absence due to randomness (Random condition) and deliberate 
non-disclosure (Not Provided condition). Only when deliberate non-disclosure was made 
salient (Refused condition), did consumers attend to it and give lower ratings to the 
deliberately non-disclosing doctor (H2). Even in this condition there was charitability, in that 
consumers did not assume the worst about the doctor, even in the Refused condition (H1b).  
 
Experiment 2: Breakeven Point for Non-Disclosure: Strategic Naiveté and Charitability 
In this experiment, all non-disclosures were deliberate. As well as investigating 
strategic naiveté and charitability, we also explore in greater detail interventions to increase 
attention to deliberate non-disclosure (H2). We tested different framings of deliberate non-
disclosure as well as an intervention designed to direct consumers’ attention to the 
undisclosed information by asking them to estimate the missing information. The latter 
intervention consisted of respondents in all non-disclosure conditions estimating the missing 
information either before or after stating how likely they would be to choose the provider. We 
expected that making an estimate of the missing information before stating this likelihood 
would increase deliberation on why the information was missing, leading to a decrease in 
strategic naiveté and/or charitability. Consumers would therefore respond more negatively to 
withheld information and be less likely to choose the provider when they estimated the 
missing information first. Kardes, et al., (2006) used a similar technique to heighten 
consumers’ cognizance of missing information, and found consumers gave more moderate 
evaluations when estimating missing information prior to giving an overall judgment. 
Finally, we measured what we call “the breakeven point”—the point at which a 
provider should be indifferent between disclosing and not disclosing information about 
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themselves, given consumers’ responses to nondisclosure. The breakeven point provides us 
with a quantitative estimate of the effects of strategic naiveté and charitability.  
Method 
Participants and design. Participants (N = 1,104 MTurkers; 442 women, 638 men, 
24 genders unreported; Mage = 31.3, SD =10.4)5 were randomly assigned to one of nine 
conditions. One condition was Full Disclosure; the other eight conditions were formed from a 
four (framing of deliberate non-disclosure) by two (timing of trustworthiness judgment) 
design. The four levels of framing were Absent, Blank, Not Provided, and Refused. 
Trustworthiness judgments were made either before or after participants estimated their 
likelihood of choosing the provider. 
Procedure. Participants role-played patients searching online for a physician. They 
viewed a profile of Dr. Green (see eFigure 2 in the supplement) and read: “All doctors in 
your region obtain ratings on five dimensions of medical care from their patients. These 
ratings are given using a scale from 0–100.” For each dimension, participants were told the 
range of evaluations given to doctors in their region. For the key trustworthiness dimension, 
this range was 51 to 99; thus 51 was the lowest possible rating. After viewing the profile, 
participants saw Dr. Green’s ratings and were informed that Dr. Green had provided the 
ratings. Those randomized to the Full Disclosure condition saw one of three trustworthiness 
ratings for Dr. Green: high (99, the top rating), intermediate (75), or low (52).  
In the remaining conditions, the trustworthiness rating was absent and both non-
disclosure framing and the sequence in which a trustworthiness rating was made were 
manipulated. The least salient Absent framing presented neither the information nor even the 
                                                 
5 Five participants had response time durations 3 SD above the mean. One participant 
reported an age of 17. Removing those participants do not change the pattern or significance 
of the results.   
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label Trustworthiness; the entire row was absent, so consumers viewed only the four 
dimensions and ratings. Although consumers were informed that all doctors obtained ratings 
on five dimensions of medical care, they would not know that the missing rating was 
trustworthiness nor necessarily even notice that a rating was missing. The Absent framing 
reflects a common version of deliberate non-disclosure in which information is absent 
without comment and the consumer may not even know it is missing.  
With the Blank framing, consumers saw a blank box where the missing 
trustworthiness rating should have been, along with the label Trustworthiness and its range 
(51–99) (see eFigure 2). Salience of non-disclosure increased with the Not Provided and 
Refused framings (parallel to conditions in Experiment 1), where the formerly blank space 
contained, respectively, the words “Doctor did not provide” and “Doctor refused to provide.”  
After reading the profile, participants estimated the likelihood they would choose that 
doctor on a scale from 0 (definitely not) to 100 (definitely). Participants also provided written 
explanations of this choice likelihood (see supplement for coding and analyses of these 
explanations). In each non-disclosure condition, half the participants estimated the 
undisclosed trustworthiness rating (on a scale from 51 to 99) before providing their choice 
likelihoods; and half did so afterward. We expected that choice likelihoods would be lower 
for those who made the trustworthiness estimates first than those who made them second. 
This applies, perhaps even more so, to the Absent framing: consumers cannot be expected to 
discount when there is no possibility of knowing what information is withheld (Absent, 
trustworthiness rating second condition). In the Absent, trustworthiness rating first condition, 
responding to the trustworthiness estimate rating allows participants to learn that the 
trustworthiness information was withheld before they made their choice likelihood ratings.  
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Results 
 Choice likelihood. Figure 3 shows choice likelihoods for all conditions including the 
three subgroups of the Full Disclosure condition (High, Intermediate and Low). Reassuringly, 
the higher the trustworthiness rating, the more likely consumers were to choose Dr. Green. 
We confirmed this observation with an overall ANOVA on the three subgroups in the Full 
Disclosure condition, F(2, 123) = 54.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .47, revealing that the trustworthiness 
dimension was extremely important for informed consumers.   
We next examined the non-disclosure conditions. A 4 (Non-disclosure Framing) by 2 
(Timing of trustworthiness estimate) ANOVA revealed a main effect of Framing, F(3, 970) = 
37.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .10; the more salient the framing of non-disclosure, the less likely 
consumers were to choose Dr. Green. There was no significant effect of Timing, F(1, 970) = 
3.31. p = .07, ηp2 = .003, nor any interaction, F(1, 970) = 1.14. p = .33, ηp2 = .004. Figure 3 
shows the main pattern clearly. We collapsed data over the Timing condition and made 
pairwise comparisons between adjacent Framing levels. The Absent and Blank framings were 
indistinguishable (p = .17), demonstrating strong effects of strategic naiveté. The choice 
likelihoods in both these conditions closely resembled (and were not significantly different 
from) those of the intermediate trustworthiness subgroup in the Full Disclosure condition. 
This suggests that when the trustworthiness dimension is missing but not made salient, the 
doctor is treated as approximately average on that dimension.  
The choice likelihoods in both Not Provided and Refused framings were significantly 
lower than those in the Absent and Blank framings; Not Provided was significantly lower than 
Blank (p = .005) and Refused was in turn significantly lower than Not Provided (p < .001). 
An important comparison is between the choice likelihood under Full Disclosure when the 
Dr. Green had low trustworthiness of 52, and the choice likelihood in the highly salient 
Refused condition. In the Full Disclosure condition, the mean choice likelihood was 34.55 
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(SD = 25.38). In the Refused condition it was 49.42 (SD = 25.71). In this environment, 
therefore, a provider with a very poor trustworthiness rating would be better off withholding 
that rating (even with the flag that they “refused” to provide it) than disclosing it. 
Trustworthiness estimates. We conducted a 4 (Non-disclosure Framing) by 2 
(Timing of trustworthiness estimate) ANOVA. The more salient the non-disclosure framing, 
the lower the trustworthiness estimate, F(3, 967) = 106.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .25: Each increase 
in framing salience significantly reduced the trustworthiness estimate (all p’s < .001). That is, 
trustworthiness estimates with the Absent framing were higher than with Blank, Blank was 
higher than Not Provided, and Not Provided was higher than Refused. Although Refused 
produced the lowest trustworthiness estimate (M = 67.27, SD = 9.72) it was still significantly 
higher that the worst possible trustworthiness score (51), t(242) = 26.09, p < .001. As 
predicted, in none of the different non-disclosure framings did consumers estimate that Dr. 
Green would have the worst possible trustworthiness rating (H1b).  
A significant but small effect of Timing was present, F(1, 967) = 5.93, p = .02, ηp2 = 
.006. Trustworthiness estimates were approximately just over one point higher when 
provided before making a choice likelihood estimate (M = 74.81, SD = 8.32) than when 
provided afterwards (M = 73.00, SD = 9.58). There was no interaction between the Non-
disclosure Framing and Timing, F(3, 967) = .23, p = .88, ηp2 = .001 
Calculating the breakeven point of disclosing trustworthiness. Focusing on Full 
Disclosure alone, we conducted a linear regression analysis predicting the likelihood of 
choosing Dr. Green from the disclosed trustworthiness level. This analysis produced the 
following (significant, F(1, 124) = 85.60, p < .001, R2 = .41) equation: 
Choice likelihood = -4.55 + 0.84*Trustworthiness level 
To calculate the breakeven point for disclosing trustworthiness, we took the mean 
choice likelihood for each level of non-disclosure framing and used the preceding equation to 
STRATEGIC NON-DISCLOSURE   
 
25 
infer the corresponding level of trustworthiness. The result is the breakeven point, at which a 
physician with this level of trustworthiness is equally likely to be chosen by disclosing or not 
disclosing the trustworthiness rating.  
For the Absent framing, the level of trustworthiness at which a doctor would be 
equally likely to be chosen whether disclosing or not is 86.60. For the Blank framing, it is 
83.44; for Not Provided it is 76.96; for Refused it is 64.25. Above these levels, doctors are 
more likely to be chosen if they disclose; below them, they are less likely to be chosen.  
Discussion 
 This study quantifies the naiveté and charitability that people display under different 
disclosure regimes. Most participants rated the provider close to average or above average for 
the missing dimension (H1a and H1b). Our salience intervention led to partial unraveling 
(H2): consumers rated the provider worse when non-disclosure framing was more salient. 
With the Absent framing, where non-disclosure was entirely shrouded, a non-disclosed 
trustworthiness rating was equivalent to trustworthiness of 87, demonstrating strategic 
naiveté; this rating fell to 64 when non-disclosure was maximally salient, but was still higher 
that the worst possible rating (51), demonstrating a high degree of charity. Notably, however, 
in contrast to Kardes, et al., (2006), asking people to provide a trustworthiness rating before 
assessing their likelihood of choosing Dr. Green did not reduce that likelihood. This pattern 
shows that in many circumstances, concealing information will often be the best strategy for 
providers even when the information they possess is not the worst possible and even when 
consumers have an opportunity to reflect on why the information is undisclosed. 
 
Experiment 3: Perspective-taking Increases Strategic Thinking in Consumers  
We next tested a further intervention to increase strategic thinking and decrease 
consumer naiveté and charitability (H2). Recipients deliberated on why non-disclosed 
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information was withheld (taking the perspective of the provider), before (vs. after) giving 
the likelihood that they would choose the provider and estimating the provider’s rating. Since 
strategic thinking is based on deliberation, we predicted that participants who first considered 
the responses of providers would more readily reason backwards and be less charitable 
towards the provider.  
In addition to being a manipulation of deliberation, the reasons given by consumers 
are informative in themselves. Recall that the unraveling prediction is premised on consumers 
inferring that the provider’s decision to withhold information is itself based on beliefs about 
how the consumer will respond to the absence of information. The reasons we elicit are a 
snapshot of these beliefs – not the ideal beliefs of the strategically rational consumer of game 
theory, but the beliefs of actual information recipients considering the absent information. 
Asking participants to consider and give a reason as to why information may be missing is in 
itself an intervention that should increase strategic thinking (H2). However, we still 
anticipated that consumers would show some levels of charitability in their stated beliefs in 
that they would not state that the provider had the worst possible information (H1b). 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants (N = 709 MTurkers; 323 women, 383 men, 2 
genders reported as “other”, 1 gender unreported; Mage = 34.8, SD = 10.5)6 were randomly 
assigned to a 2 (Intervention: Control vs Deliberation) x 2 (Non-disclosure Framing: Not 
Provided vs Declined) between-subject design. We expected an interaction such that 
Deliberation would have a greater effect on reducing the likelihood to choose the provider in 
the Not Provided framing than in the Declined framing (in which participants are already 
directed to consider the deliberate non-disclosure). 
                                                 
6 Ten participants had response time durations 3 SD above the mean. Removing those 
participants do not change the pattern or significance of the results.   
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Procedure. Participants role-played patients searching for a doctor and were 
informed that all doctors in their region received a patient satisfaction rating ranging from 1 
to 5 stars. They were presented with a description of what each star meant, with 1 indicating 
very poor and 5 indicating excellent, and then the profile of a doctor (eFigure 5). The final 
row of the profile was labeled, “Patient satisfaction rating” and participants read either that 
“Doctor Green did not provide the Rating” (Not Provided framing) or “Doctor Green 
declined to provide the Rating” (Declined framing).7  
In the Deliberation condition, participants were first asked “In your opinion, why is 
the Patient Satisfaction Rating missing from Doctor Green’s profile?” and wrote their 
explanations. Participants were then asked to consider what the lowest Patient Satisfaction 
Rating Doctor Green would likely put on the profile. To do this, participants were encouraged 
to consider whether the doctor would be likely to disclosure a 5 star rating, or a 3 star or a 1 
star rating. These two questions represented our perspective-taking manipulation. Thereafter, 
participants were presented with Doctor Green’s profile again and stated how likely they 
would be to choose the doctor on a 0 to 100 scale, and estimated the missing star rating. 
Participants in the Control condition answered the same questions but in a different 
order. They first rated how likely they would be to choose Doctor Green and estimated the 
missing star rating. Only after this did they experience the perspective-taking manipulation: 
they wrote their explanations on why the Patient Satisfaction Rating was missing and they 
considered the lowest Patient Satisfaction Rating Doctor Green would likely put on the 
profile. 
                                                 
7 The term “Declined” was used in place of “Refused” in Experiments 1 and 2, since we 
judged it a less loaded term that nonetheless conveyed clearly that it was the Doctor’s choice 
not to provide the information. “I decline to answer” is also used regularly particularly in 
legal contexts to refer to the right to not give information (Greer, 1990).  
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We coded participants’ written explanations for why the Patient Satisfaction Rating 
was missing from Doctor Green’s profile as explained below. First, we distinguished between 
those explanations that proposed non-deliberate versus deliberate withholding of information. 
Second, we distinguished between different types of “deliberate” explanations. Inter-coder 
reliabilities for each category, measured by Cohen’s kappa, are shown in Table 1a: 
1) Non-deliberate: This code was used when non-disclosure was explained as due to factors 
such as the rating not being available, technical difficulties, forgetting on the part of 
Doctor Green, or the high cost of displaying the rating. The essence of a non-deliberate 
explanation is that it suggests Doctor Green did not actively and intentionally withhold 
their rating. An example is, “He seems like a capable doctor, perhaps he just forgot to put 
it on his profile.” A non-deliberate explanation suggests the possibility of strategic 
naïveté.   
2) Deliberate: This code was used when non-disclosure was interpreted as due to an active 
intentional choice by Dr. Green to withhold the information. The perspective-taking 
intervention in this study should move recipients to these “deliberate” categories by 
increasing deliberation on the non-disclosure (H2).  
a. Irrelevant explanations were used when participants agreed the doctor had 
actively withheld their rating, but because the information was (a) of poor quality 
or unreliable, (b) irrelevant, or (c) ambiguous. While the category was broad, the 
core implication was that the reasons for non-disclosure were independent of the 
level of the rating. For example, “Probably because these sorts of reviews tend to 
be awful for objective measure when people rate basic service a 5 or 1 bomb 
someone that looked at them wrong.”  
b. Partial unraveling implied that respondents suspected that the deliberate non-
disclosure was due to the level of the rating and could have an effect on 
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consumer’s evaluations. For example, respondents may have explicitly said that 
the ratings are poor, or that the doctor is “hiding something”, or the ratings are bad 
for business. An example is “He might either have a low score or just an average 
one.” Although this code was used when recipients recognized non-disclosure as 
deliberate and reflecting something negative about the rating, it did not necessarily 
imply the ultimate level of unraveling implied by the game theory argument (that 
the doctor has the worst possible rating) thus we predicted recipients would still 
be charitable (H1b) despite the perspective-taking intervention.   
c. Full unraveling responses implied that participants gave the normatively 
sophisticated response as to why Doctor Green did not disclose his Patient 
Satisfaction Rating – in that, as predicted by game theory, it is because Dr. Green 
is likely to have the worst possible rating.  
d. Other deliberate responses indicated that the doctor had withheld the information, 
but either did not speculate as to why (for example, “The doctor declined to 
provide the information”) or gave a reason that did not fit into the other categories 
(for example, “maybe he already has enough patients and doesn't want to 
overload his current practice due to his high rating”).   
Each response could be coded for multiple explanations and some participants gave 
multiple reasons such as, “He either doesn’t like the rating and feels it reflects poorly on him, 
or he's old and doesn't really know how to set up his profile.” If responses did not fall into 
any of these categories, they were coded as “other.” For example, some participants indicated 
they did not know or were unwilling to speculate about the reason for the information being 
missing.  
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Results 
 Choosing the provider. As predicted, there was an interaction between Framing and 
Intervention, F(1, 705) = 9.48, p = .002, ηp2 = .01, but no main effects of Framing, F(1, 705) 
= 1.46, p = .23, or Intervention, F(1, 705) = .14, p = .71. The interaction took the predicted 
form: In the low-salience Not Provided framing, participants were less likely to choose the 
doctor in the Deliberation (M = 35.72, SD = 21.48) than in the Control condition (M = 41.73, 
SD = 23.50), F(1, 705) = 6.01, p = .015, ηp2 = .008. In the Declined framing, there was no 
effect of deliberation, (M = 38.98, SD = 24.39 vs M = 34.25, SD = 23.06), F(1, 705) = 3.64, p 
= .06. We also replicated our findings from Experiments 1 and 2: participants were more 
likely to choose the doctor in the Not Provided condition vs. the Declined condition (without 
deliberation): F(1, 705) = 9.51, p = .002, ηp2 = .01), but this difference was eliminated with 
deliberation, F(1, 705) = 1.70, p = .19.  
  Estimate of the missing information. There was a main effect of Framing, F(1, 705) 
= 5.63, p = .02, ηp2 = .008, and a Framing by Intervention interaction, F(1, 705) = 6.46, p = 
.011, ηp2 = .009, but no main effect of Intervention, F(1, 705) = .002, p = .97. The main effect 
of Framing was estimates of the patient satisfaction rating were lower in the Declined 
framing (M = 2.49, SD = .87) than in the Not Provided framing, (M = 2.65, SD = .81). The 
estimates in the Declined framing were nonetheless much higher than the minimum of 1 star, 
indicating the charitability of recipients towards the missing information, t(353) = 32.21, p < 
.001.  
 The interaction was as expected. In the Control conditions, the more salient Declined 
framing (M = 2.42, SD = .87) produced lower estimates than the Not Provided framing (M = 
2.73, SD = .91), F(1, 705) = 12.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .02. But in the Deliberation conditions, 
there was no effect of framing (M = 2.58, SD = .86 vs M = 2.57, SD = .72), F(1, 705) = .01, p 
= .91.   
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Lowest star rating the doctor would disclose. The effect of perspective-taking, 
while significant, was smaller than would be expected if participants were fully strategic. An 
explanation for this is the strikingly high level of charitability in consumer’s estimates of the 
doctor’s personal breakeven point, the point at which the doctor will no longer disclose; the 
mean was 3.24 stars (SD = .68), much higher than the lowest 1 star rating, t(708) = 69.43, p < 
.001.8 This means that even reflecting on reasons for non-disclosure does not produce 
maximum suspicion on the part of consumers.  
Coding and analyses of reasons for why information is missing. Table 1a 
summarizes the number and percentage of reasons given that fall into the main categories of 
Non-deliberate, and Deliberate (Irrelevant, Partial unraveling, Full unraveling and Other 
deliberate explanations). Table 1b gives example statements for each category.  
Our perspective-taking intervention seemed to work (i.e., increased deliberation on 
the non-disclosure) in that when asked to consider why the information was missing the great 
majority (86%) of participants provided at least one Deliberate explanation. However, there 
were responses in each category: 13% of recipients offered Non-deliberate explanations for 
non-disclosure, suggesting a degree of strategic naïveté. Of those who gave Deliberate 
explanations, 15% suggested the missing information might have been judged Irrelevant, and 
75% inferred something negative about the rating, demonstrating at least Partial unraveling. 
Both these categories reveal some degree of charitability towards the doctor. Only one 
participant engaged in Full unraveling and contemplated that the doctor’s rating is probably a 
1 star (this participant was in the Declined framing condition).    
                                                 
8 In all conditions, participants gave estimates of the lowest star rating the doctor would 
disclose after their written explanations of why the rating was missing (this was part of the 
perspective-taking deliberation manipulation); thus, we expected and found no differences 
between conditions (all ps > .15). 
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The framing of non-disclosure as Declined vs. Not-provided had the predicted effect 
on whether explanations referred to Non-deliberate withholding of information. Non-
deliberate explanations were more likely in the Not provided frame (19%) than in the 
Declined (8%) frame, Χ2(1) = 20.30, p < .001. There was no effect of framing on the sub-
categories of the Deliberate explanations: We suggest that while the Declined frame made 
the non-deliberate explanation less plausible, it did not make people more likely to view the 
missing information as negative.  
Discussion 
Experiment 3 identified a perspective-taking intervention that also increased the 
salience of non-disclosure by emphasizing how it occurred deliberately. While the 
perspective-taking intervention did not lead to full unraveling and maximum skepticism 
(aside from one participant; H1b), participants did realize that the undisclosed information 
was likely to be deliberately withheld and less favorable for the doctor (H2). This 
demonstrates that interventions to increase perspective-taking can increase consumers’ 
deliberation on the missing information and consequently become a bit more skeptical about 
non-disclosure.   
 
 Experiment 4: Comparing Multiple Profiles and Highly Salient Non-Disclosure 
One way deliberate non-disclosure can become salient is through comparison with 
disclosed information. If you compare the specifications for two cell phones, and one states 
the battery life and the other does not, you might infer that if the phone manufacturer did not 
mention battery life it is because the battery life is inadequate relative to other phones on the 
market. Studies that examine separate vs. joint (side-by-side) evaluations support the view 
that joint evaluations make comparisons easier by providing a reference to which one can 
compare and contrast (Hsee, 1996; Hsee & Zhang, 2010; Kardes & Sanbonmatsu, 1993). In 
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economics, much theoretical work has discussed how unraveling can occur when there is 
competition between providers, even when the consumer might not initially know the 
information exists (e.g., Milgrom, 2008).  
In this experiment, we investigated responses to deliberate non-disclosure when it can 
be contrasted with disclosure by other parties. In addition to this “other party disclosure,” we 
again flagged deliberate non-disclosure, with different non-disclosure framings. We predicted 
that consumers would display less strategic naïveté and charitability if they were able to 
compare across providers (H2). 
Method 
Students from a U.S. university (N = 117; 47 women, 70 men; Mage = 21.7, SD = 1.3)9  
evaluated four different doctor profiles from the perspective of patients searching for a 
doctor. Two key pieces of information were the doctors’ trustworthiness and conflicts of 
interest which were either disclosed or not disclosed. Trustworthiness ratings had a range 
from 30 (lowest possible) to 90 (top rating) and conflict of interest statements could be 
classified as none, minor or strong. All other information on the profile was disclosed. 
Patients evaluated all four physicians in any order – each physician profile was on a separate 
page, but participants could move freely back and forth between profiles to compare them for 
as long as they wanted. The profiles and conditions are described below (also see eFigure 6 in 
the supplement). 
Physician profiles. Doctor W was our baseline full disclosure profile, i.e., the doctor 
always had both trustworthiness and conflict of interest statements disclosed. The specific 
levels of trustworthiness and conflict of interest were chosen randomly from the three 
possible levels for trustworthiness (50, 70, or 80), and for conflict of interest (none, minor or 
                                                 
9 Three participants had response time durations 3 SD above the mean. Removing those 
participants do not change the pattern or significance of the results.   
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strong). Doctor X was our doctor of interest (ratings for Doctor X were our main dependent 
variable). This doctor had low (50) trustworthiness (but not the worst possible which was 30) 
and a strong conflict of interest. This information was optional, meaning in some conditions 
it was disclosed and in others not-disclosed.  
The remaining two doctors, Doctors Y and Z, were comparison doctors, included to 
make the missing information from Doctor X’s profile more conspicuous. Doctor Y had 
moderate trustworthiness (70) and no conflict of interest. Doctor Y’s trustworthiness was 
optional information. Doctor Z had high trustworthiness (80) and a minor conflict of interest. 
Doctor Z’s conflict of interest was optional.  
Conditions. Participants were randomized into four between subject conditions, 
which differed in whether optional information was disclosed, and in how non-disclosure was 
flagged. In the Full Disclosure condition, all information was displayed for all four physician 
profiles. This condition provided us with a baseline for Doctor X, who had the worst possible 
value on conflict of interest and a trustworthiness level of 50.  
In the remaining three conditions, the optional information was undisclosed, and 
varied as follows: The least salient Absent condition did not display the information, the table 
row or the name of the missing dimension (as in Experiment 2). The table row and 
information were present for other profiles, so participants would have to compare profiles to 
notice that information appeared in some but not other profiles. In the moderate salience 
Blank condition, the table row and name of the missing dimension, along with the range of 
possible values for the missing dimension were provided and there was a blank space where 
the missing information should be displayed. In the high salience Declined condition, as with 
the Blank condition, the table row, dimension name and range of values for the dimension 
were displayed and in the space where the missing information should be displayed, 
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participants saw “declined to disclose.” After comparing the profiles, participants indicated 
how likely they were to choose each of the four physicians on a scale from 0 to 100.  
Results and Discussion 
Choosing Doctor X. We conducted a univariate ANOVA with the likelihood of 
choosing Dr. X as the dependent variable, and the four between subject conditions as the 
independent variable. Covariates included the likelihood of choosing Dr. W, Dr. W’s 
trustworthiness rating and Dr. W’s conflict of interest (rated on a 3-point scale, with 1=none, 
2= minor, and 3=strong).10 We conducted pairwise comparisons between the four disclosure 
conditions, specifically comparing Full Disclosure with the Absent, Blank and Declined non-
disclosure conditions, and comparing the three non-disclosure conditions to each other.  
Ratings for Dr. X displayed a significant main effect of disclosure condition, F(3, 
110) = 16.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .31 (Figure 4). Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant 
difference (p = .19) between the Full Disclosure condition (M = 44.82, SD = 23.58) and the 
Declined condition (M = 48.04, SD = 28.21) for the likelihood to choose Doctor X. Thus, we 
find that when multiple profiles were explicitly combined with the strong words “declined to 
disclose” participants did infer it to be equivalent to full disclosure of poor information. 
The remaining non-disclosure conditions, Blank (M = 67.10, SD = 14.56) and Absent 
(M = 69.52, SD = 16.04), were not significantly different from each other (p = .48) but 
produced significantly higher choice likelihoods than the Full Disclosure condition (both p’s 
< .001).  
Overall, Experiments 1 through 4 all show some success in our interventions to 
induce people to treat undisclosed information a little more skeptically. Indeed, when 
participants viewed multiple profiles side by side when deliberate non-disclosure was made 
                                                 
10 Results are similar if the covariates are removed from the model. 
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highly salient and flagged by the words “declined to provide,” participants displayed the 
maximum skepticism predicted by game theory.  
 
Experiment 5: Providers’ Reasons for Deliberate Non-Disclosure 
In Experiment 5, we investigated what providers would do when given the 
opportunity to disclose or withhold information of varying quality about themselves, when 
consumers would know that they had made that decision. Participants simulated the role of 
physicians deciding what information to put on their website: they made disclosure decisions 
and justified those decisions. We predicted that just as the consumers in our previous studies 
showed limited strategic behavior, so, for the most part, would the providers in this study—
i.e., they would not disclose at the rates predicted by unraveling theory. Importantly, the 
reasons they would give for their decisions would not typically contain strategic thinking 
(H3). We expected most providers would base their assessments on Level 0 thinking 
(Camerer & Johnson, 2004), in which they disclosed information they believed would give a 
good impression without considering the effects of not disclosing.  
Methods 
Participants, design and procedure. Mturkers (N = 310; 112 women, 197 men, 1 
gender unreported; Mage = 31.2, SD = 11.2)11 simulated the role of a physician compiling an 
online profile to attract new patients and were randomized into one of nine conditions in a 3 
(Trust: low vs. moderate vs. high) x 3 (Conflict of Interest: none vs. minor vs. strong) 
between subject design.  
Each participant first viewed their main profile (see eFigure 7) which contained 
information that had to be on their profile, such as their specialty (internist), their admitting 
                                                 
11 Three participants had response time durations 3 SD above the mean. Removing those 
participants do not change the pattern or significance of the results.   
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hospital, board certification, certification date, medical school, and faculty appointment. They 
were next presented with two optional profile items: residency information (a filler item) and 
a conflict of interest disclosure statement. Conflict of interest was randomized to three levels: 
strong (received over $500,000 from Pfizer in 2010, 2011 and 2012), minor (received $1,000 
from Wyeth in 2010), and none (no competing interests). They chose whether to disclose 
both residency and conflict of interest.  
Participants next viewed their average patient evaluation scores which included 
trustworthiness. They were told these evaluations came from patients who used scales from 
0-100, where 0 is extremely poor and 100 is outstanding. The range of evaluations for all 
doctors in their region was also displayed. Three of the evaluations were optional to display: 
two filler items (office environment and friendliness—both at the top of the scale for all 
conditions) and the trustworthiness rating. Participants were randomized to have either low 
(50), intermediate (70), or high (80) trustworthiness ratings. The low rating was nowhere near 
the bottom of the possible range (30), and the high rating was not quite at the top (90).  
Participants were informed their potential patients would “see the labels exactly as 
they are shown [on the profile], including the ranges, even if the information about you is left 
blank.” They therefore knew that patients would see an online profile similar to what 
participants viewed in the Blank condition of Experiments 2 and 4.  
Participants also stated why they made their decision to reveal or not reveal their 
trustworthiness and conflict of interest. These responses were coded into the following four 
categories: (inter-coder reliabilities for each category, measured by Cohen’s kappa, are 
shown in Table 2a): 
1) Strategic explanations include at least a minimal understanding that consumers would 
recognize non-disclosure and respond negatively to it. An example is: “If I had not 
included it, patients would be able to see a blank spot under Conflict of Interest 
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Disclosure. It is better to disclose it than have patients think I'm hiding something.”  
When coding, we were very liberal in our interpretation of strategic thinking. To refer to 
the “Level-k” analysis discussed earlier, anything from “Level-1” or above would be 
classed as Strategic. 
2) Naïve inference explanations implied that the information disclosed would have an effect 
on consumer’s evaluations, but with no reference to what would happen if it were not 
disclosed. An example was “If people see that my trustworthiness rating is 70 they may 
not trust me.” Such a statement, if not accompanied by (for instance) “… but if they don’t 
see the rating they may not trust me either” was coded as a naïve inference. With 
reference to the Level k analysis, this would amount to Level 0 thinking.  
3) Irrelevant explanations were used to imply the information was (a) of poor quality or 
unreliable, (b) irrelevant, or (c) ambiguous. For example, “Because I don't think that 
[rating] would affect my judgement as a doctor, so I don't think it's relevant.” Providers 
often used these reasons in a way that we interpreted as ad-hoc justifications for not 
disclosing. Note that irrelevant explanations are not a “strategically rational” reason for 
not disclosing, because consumers should still notice that information is missing.   
4) Ethics. These explanations referred to ethical obligations, usually to disclose information. 
Terms like “ought,” “should,” “honesty,” “fairness,” “integrity,” and “transparency” were 
associated with these explanations. An example response is: “I try not to hide much about 
myself in general, so I chose to display everything. I enjoy being as transparent as I can.” 
If responses did not fall into any of these categories, they were coded as “other.”  
 We have not listed a category of response that might be called “sophisticated 
normative reasoning.” In line with how the term sophisticated is used in behavioral 
economics, this would involve explaining that non-disclosure is the best decision because 
consumers won’t think strategically. For instance, a participant might have said “If patients 
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were rational strategic thinkers I would disclose, but they are not.” We scoured all responses 
for hints of such reasoning but found none.  
Results  
Disclosure decisions. As expected, disclosure decisions did not follow the pattern 
predicted by unraveling theory (see eFigure 8 in the supplement). According to theory, 
everyone would disclose their trustworthiness rating. But at a trustworthiness rating of 50 
only 28% disclosed. Significantly more (54%) disclosed when the rating was 70, χ2(1) = 
14.95, p < .001, and more again (88%) when it was 80, χ2(1) = 27.81, p < .001. In no group 
was there 100% disclosure. Similarly, in none of the conflict of interest groups was there 
100% disclosure or even close to it. Significantly more participants disclosed no conflict 
(62%) than a minor conflict (42%), χ2(1) = 8.39, p = .004; and more displayed minor 
conflicts than strong conflicts (20%), χ2(1) =10.31, p = .001. The overall pattern is one of 
“partial unraveling,” in which the providers disclosed at a higher rate the better their 
performance but did not disclose anywhere near the rate predicted by unraveling theory. 
Reasons for (non)disclosure. Table 2a summarizes the number and percentage of 
reasons given that fall into the four categories (Strategic, Naïve inference, Irrelevant, and 
Ethical) when making disclosure decisions under all levels of trustworthiness and conflict of 
interest. Table 2b gives example statements for each category. 
Supporting H3, few participants provided even rudimentary Strategic explanations for 
their disclosure decisions (only 9% for trustworthiness disclosures and 4% for conflict of 
interest disclosures). The use of strategic reasoning was independent of the specific level of 
trustworthiness, χ2(2) = 1.95, p = .38, and conflict of interest, χ2(2) = 3.30, p = .19, and all but 
one who used strategic reasoning disclosed their information. The one exception was a 
participant who came to a strategic insight after their disclosure decision: “I viewed 50 as bad 
and would bring negativity to my name. Looking back this may make me look less trustworthy 
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though.” In addition, virtually everyone who used strategic reasoning for trustworthiness and 
conflict of interest disclosed their residency, office environment and friendliness information 
as well.  
The Irrelevant category contained responses that expressed concerns that the 
information was irrelevant, unreliable or ambiguous, and usually was used as a justification 
for non-disclosure. This category was more widely used for the non-disclosure of conflict of 
interest statements (25%) than for trustworthiness (9%). Conflicts of interest were often 
described as being irrelevant or something that patients do not need to know, as in “… it has 
nothing to do with my quality of care. It also is not really anyone’s business how I conduct 
myself as long as it is in best interests of the patients and legal.” For trustworthiness, 
responses in this category typically revolved around issues of information reliability or 
accuracy, as in “it wasn't so low that it would put the average person off, but it's kind of a 
weird metric. How do you measure that accurately?”  
The Naïve inference category was used far more frequently than any other category 
(66% for trustworthiness and 55% for conflict of interest). Providers chose based mainly on 
how they, and consumers, would directly evaluate the information if they saw it, but without 
considering what consumers might infer when information is missing (strategic naiveté). As 
Tables 2a and 2b show, this reasoning was mostly used to explain disclosure of high ratings, 
and non-disclosure of low ratings. The primary determinant of whether to disclose, therefore, 
was based on the (naïve) interpretation of the content being disclosed.  
Ethical reasons were given 15% of the time for trustworthiness and 19% of the time 
for conflict of interest. Ethical reasoning was associated with a high level of disclosure, even 
when the information to disclose was not the best. Of the 31 participants who disclosed a low 
trustworthiness score, 14 (45%) gave an ethical explanation, as did 11 of the 19 participants 
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(58%) who disclosed a high conflict of interest. As seen in Table 2a, ethical explanations 
were the best predictor of disclosure for high conflicts of interest or low trustworthiness.  
A few reasons fell into the “other” category (see Table 2b). One issue raised by 
participants with regards to conflict of interest is that by disclosing information you make 
people consider possibilities they otherwise would not. If people do not realize information is 
missing, it is a strategically valid reason for not disclosing it (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003). We 
had emphasized in the instructions that missing information would be highlighted on the 
doctor’s web site, but a (few) providers either ignored this instruction, or else felt consumers 
might not notice anyway.  
Discussion 
As predicted (H3), there was limited strategic thinking by providers in this study. 
Only a few explanations reflected strategic reasoning, and those that did were almost 
invariably accompanied by disclosure. There was no evidence to suggest participants did not 
disclose because they thought consumers were naïve. Non-disclosure, at least in this setting, 
is not being used as a sophisticated strategic response (as previous theoretic work suggests: 
Brown et al., 2013; Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003; King & Wallin, 1991). Instead, participants 
simply did not entertain any version of the unraveling argument.  
The most common reason given for disclosing was to publicize good information and 
the most common reason for not disclosing was to withhold bad information. This is a 
manifestation of naïve “Level-0” thinking (e.g., Camerer & Johnson, 2004). The decision to 
not disclose, taken by most providers deciding whether to disclose average or poor 
information, demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking in that they failed to consider the 
responses of consumers to that missing information (H3). As our prior experiments show, 
however, consumers do not always draw negative inferences about missing information; thus, 
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the lack of strategic thinking by providers might be an (unforeseen) optimal response due to 
the corresponding naiveté and charitability of consumers.  
 
Experiment 6: Medical Professionals’ Reasons for Deliberate Non-Disclosure 
In this experiment, we examine the generalizability of the results from lay participants 
in Experiment 5 to investigate if actual physicians and health care professionals would 
behave similarly when deciding whether to disclose or withhold information of varying 
quality. These real providers viewed the same stimuli materials as in Experiment 5, made 
disclosure decisions and justified those decisions. We predicted that these real providers 
would behave similarly to our lay participants in Experiment 5 and base their disclosure 
decisions on what they believed would give a good impression to information recipients 
without considering the effects of not disclosing.  
Methods 
Participants, design and procedure. Physicians and health care professionals (N = 
56; 34 women, 22 men; Mage = 41.6, SD = 9.7)12 from an executive Healthcare Leadership 
course at a U.S. business school took part in a similar study as that in Experiment 5. They 
imagined that they were compiling a physician profile and were randomized into one of four 
conditions in a 2 (Trust: low vs. high) x 2 (Conflict of Interest: none vs. strong) between 
subject design.  
As in the prior experiment, each participant decided what optional information to 
disclose or not disclose on the physician profile. Unlike the prior experiment there were only 
two (rather than three) conflict of interest and trust levels (due to the smaller sample size of 
real providers that we had access to). The rest of the procedure including the coding was as 
described in the prior experiment. 
                                                 
12 No participants had response time durations 3 SD above the mean.  
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Results  
Disclosure decisions. Disclosure decisions followed the same pattern as in the prior 
experiment: expert providers were less likely to disclose a low trustworthiness rating of 50 
(15%) versus a higher rating of 80, (80%), χ2(1) = 23.26, p < .001, and they were less likely 
to disclose strong conflicts (29%) versus no conflict (66%), χ2(1) = 7.29, p = .007. Again, this 
pattern is one of partial unraveling, in which the providers disclosed at a higher frequency the 
better their ratings but they did not disclose anywhere near the rate predicted by unraveling 
theory. 
Reasons for (non)disclosure. Table 2c summarizes the number and percentage of 
reasons given that fall into the four categories (Strategic, Naïve inference, Irrelevant, and 
Ethical) when making disclosure decisions under all levels of trustworthiness and conflict of 
interest.  
As in the prior experiment, supporting H3, few providers gave an even rudimentary 
Strategic explanation for their disclosure decisions (only 7% for trustworthiness disclosures 
and 4% for conflict of interest disclosures). The use of strategic reasoning was again 
independent of the specific level of trustworthiness, χ2(1) = 0.80, p = .37, and conflict of 
interest, χ2(1) = 0.04, p = .85, and all but one who used strategic reasoning disclosed their 
information.  
The Irrelevant category contained responses that expressed concerns that the 
information was irrelevant, unreliable or ambiguous, and again was mainly used as a 
justification for non-disclosure. This category was more widely used for the non-disclosure of 
conflict of interest statements (27%) than for trustworthiness (14%). Similar to our lay 
participants, real providers also described conflicts of interest as being irrelevant or 
something that patients do not need to know, as in “Irrelevant to patient care - more 
important to disclose when conducting public education sessions or disclosing research for 
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collaborative interests/projects with pharmaceutical companies.” For trustworthiness, 
providers mentioned issues of information accuracy and subjectivity, as in “Trustworthiness 
is sort of a subjective virtue. Some patients may consider you not trustworthy simply because 
you changed higher than the next doctor. But they may not be aware that you are more 
experienced or maybe charge higher to keep a certain kind of clientele.”  
Like lay participants, real providers used the Naïve inference category far more 
frequently than any other category (73% for trustworthiness and 64% for conflict of interest). 
Providers chose based mainly on how they, and patients, would directly evaluate the 
information if they saw it, but without considering what patients might infer when 
information is missing. As Table 2c shows, this reasoning was mostly used to explain 
disclosure of high ratings, and non-disclosure of low ratings (note that some of the providers 
thought a rating of 80 for trustworthiness was not “high enough” for a physician practice – 
recall that the top rating for physicians in their region is 90 -- e.g., “A higher score is 
expected in the public opinion to promote the office”). Once again, therefore, the crucial 
determinant of whether to disclose was based on the direct inference of the content being 
disclosed.  
Ethical reasons were given 11% of the time for trustworthiness and 12% of the time 
for conflict of interest. Ethical reasoning was almost always associated with disclosure 
regardless of the whether the information was good or poor. Of the four providers who 
disclosed a low trustworthiness score, three (75%) gave an ethical explanation, as did six of 
the seven providers (86%) who disclosed a strong conflict of interest. Thus, ethical 
explanations were the best predictor of disclosure for high conflicts of interest or low 
trustworthiness.  
A few reasons fell into the “other” category. Like lay participants, real providers also 
raised the issue that even mentioning the term conflict of interest may make patients worry 
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about them even if you had none. Real providers also noted that conflict of interest 
information is already available to patients through the Open Payments / Sunshine Act (see 
https://www.cms.gov/openpayments/) and thus not necessary to disclose. Although we had 
emphasized in the instructions that missing information would be highlighted on the doctor’s 
web site, a few providers either ignored this instruction, or else felt patients might not notice 
anyway.  
Discussion 
This experiment reveals that real expert providers behaved similarly to lay 
participants in Experiment 5. Again, as predicted (H3), only a very few explanations reflected 
strategic reasoning. The most common reason given for disclosing was to publicize good 
information and the most common reason for not disclosing was to withhold bad information 
consistent with “Level-0” thinking.  
 
General Discussion 
We find evidence of limited strategic thinking about deliberate non-disclosure by both 
information providers and recipients. Recipients demonstrate strategic naiveté when they do 
not distinguish between deliberate and non-deliberate non-disclosures (Experiment 1). Even 
when they notice that disclosure is deliberate, they show high levels of charitability towards 
the missing information and to the information provider (Experiments 2 to 4).  
Interventions to increase the strategic thinking of recipients had varying success. 
Indeed, recipients were almost completely unresponsive to non-disclosure unless their 
attention was drawn to it by terms such as “declined” or “refused.” Recipients were more 
likely to note non-disclosure was deliberate, and they exhibited less charitability, when they 
considered why a provider might not disclose (Experiment 3). They were also more likely to 
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notice deliberate non-disclosure when they could compare multiple providers, some of whom 
disclosed and some of whom did not (Experiment 4).  
Like recipients, providers demonstrated strategic naiveté. Providers mainly considered 
how consumers would interpret disclosed information and they did not even entertain the 
possibility that consumers could make inferences about non-disclosed information 
(Experiments 5 and 6).  
An Analysis of the Assumptions for Full Unraveling  
Game theory predicts that strategically rational consumers will infer that deliberate 
non-disclosure of decision-relevant information means that information is the worst possible, 
providing certain assumptions are met. These assumptions (outlined more extensively in the 
introduction) include unambiguous ranking of dimensions, and costless and credible 
disclosures (i.e., the provider has the information and cannot lie). In the “outside world” it is 
unlikely these assumptions hold all the time. Considering this, non-disclosure may be the 
optimal choice for providers even if consumers are strategically rational. And if some (even 
high-quality) providers do not disclose when they “should,” then it becomes increasingly 
possible for other providers (especially mediocre and poor-quality ones) who might otherwise 
disclose to hide themselves in the thicket of non-disclosers. Consequently, full unraveling 
may not occur even if both providers and consumers are strategically rational. 
One domain in which the assumptions for full unraveling may not be met is in the 
disclosure of calorie counts in restaurant menus. First, the ranking is ambiguous since fewer 
calories in a meal are not necessarily better than more calories (Downs, Wisdom, Wansink, & 
Loewenstein, 2013). It may also be costly to acquire calorie count information for each dish 
displayed on the menu. Moreover, knowledge of calories can also decrease consumers’ 
enjoyment of food (Thunström, 2019; Thunström, Nordström, Shogren, Ehmke, & van’t 
Veld, 2016; Woolley & Risen, 2018), and this imposes a further cost of disclosure in the form 
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of consumer dissatisfaction. We should therefore not expect universal disclosure of calorie 
counts. Indeed, this is why legislation is being used to require restaurants to provide them 
(Bollinger, Leslie, & Sorensen, 2011). And that legislation is itself controversial in part 
because it may not benefit consumers (e.g., Dumanovsky et al., 2011; Elbel, Kersh, Brescoll, 
& Dixon, 2009; Kiszko, Martinez, Abrams, & Elbel, 2014; Swartz, Braxton, & Viera, 2011). 
Another situation in which the unraveling assumptions will not fully apply is when an 
information provider has a vast amount of information and it is unfeasible to disclose all of it. 
Too many disclosures can overwhelm consumers, as can lengthy, complex or unintelligible 
disclosures (Ben-Shahar & Schneider, 2011). A rational provider will want to make selective 
disclosure and so consumer skepticism should be tempered by this consideration. Other 
psychological factors can also come into play. For instance, too much positive information 
can lead consumers to suspect selective disclosure so that withholding even positive 
information can sometimes make sense (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Shu & Carlson, 2014).  
Sometimes the assumptions for full unraveling appear not to be met but actually are. 
Consider, for instance, the case of grade non-disclosure policies seen at some schools, 
particularly U.S. business schools. This policy can prohibit universities from revealing 
student grades or graduate GPAs to recruiters. Despite this prohibition, students are free to 
inform recruiters about their undergraduate GPAs or their business school test scores, honors, 
or awards, such as the Dean’s List. Likewise, employers are often forbidden from asking 
potential employees for personal information, such as health status. However, job candidates 
can voluntarily provide this, or similar “proxy”, information, and so employers can draw 
inferences about the failure to make a voluntary provision (Peppet, 2011). As Richard Posner 
(1998, p. 103) put it: “it is difficult to see how a pooling equilibrium is avoided in which 
privacy is ‘voluntarily’ surrendered, making the legal protection of privacy futile.” We need 
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not be quite as despairing as Posner to see that the opportunity to voluntarily provide 
information can sometimes turn into an obligation to provide that information.  
As we have shown, however, the strict theoretical approach to unraveling is only the 
starting point to understanding what will happen when some people have the opportunity to 
disclose, and others have the opportunity to interpret that (non-) disclosure. Even when 
unraveling assumptions are met, both our experiments and evidence from the field (Brown et 
al., 2012; Jin & Leslie, 2003; Mathios, 2000) demonstrates that consumers do not infer the 
worse from missing information. Consequently, providers can “get away” with non-
disclosure. Indeed, if we allow for strategically naïve or charitable consumers, there will be 
incomplete disclosure by providers.  
In many cases, non-disclosure may be a preferred strategy for providers because the 
worst inferences are still in the imagination of consumers rather than in stark reality (Frank, 
2008). That is, there is a difference between what can be inferred from the absence of 
information, and the concrete fact being revealed. A (guilty) suspect who refuses to testify 
might reasonably assume that her guilt-affirming silence will have less impact on a jury than 
an outright confession (Kassin, 2005; Kassin & Sukel, 1997). Indeed, as we found in 
Experiments 1 to 4, simply informing people that information that could have been disclosed 
but was not barely influenced consumers. But as the non-disclosure became more salient and 
closer to an uncooperative scenario, as indicated by the provider having “refused” or 
“declined” to provide information, people became increasingly wary of the provider. This 
inference could explain why John et al. (2016) found full unraveling in their studies when 
recipients were informed that a provider had “chosen not to answer” a question. A refusal to 
answer a question increases the salience of that deliberately withheld information.  
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Is Less Disclosure Sometimes Better?  
It is important to consider the consequences to consumers of full disclosure, however 
it is achieved. The effects are not always positive. For example, if people do not want 
information that is negative, they may choose to avoid seeing it even if it might improve their 
decision-making (Gigerenzer & Garcia-Retamero, 2017; Golman, Hagmann, & Loewenstein, 
2017; Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller, & Shepperd, 2010). Research on conflict of interest 
disclosures show multiple ways in which such disclosures can produce unintended 
consequences for consumers (Loewenstein, Sah, & Cain, 2012; Sah, 2016). For example, 
conflict of interest disclosures can increase pressure to comply with poor-quality advice due 
to consumers’ reluctance to signal their distrust in their provider (Sah, Loewenstein, & Cain, 
2013, 2019). Conflict of interest disclosures might also paradoxically increase trust in the 
provider’s expertise, especially when consumers are distracted and process the disclosure 
automatically rather than deliberatively (Sah, Malaviya, & Thompson, 2018). The opposite 
effect may also occur, in which disclosures make consumers skeptical and therefore prone to 
reject even high quality advice (Sah & Feiler, 2019). Conflict of interest disclosure can also 
affect providers themselves, increasing or decreasing bias in their advice (Sah, 2019).   
 In summary, full disclosure may sometimes have unintended consequences. However, 
for information that is important, reliable and relevant to a decision (and in conditions in 
which the assumptions for full unraveling are met), our studies show that consumers are 
insufficiently strategic. Consumers do not recognize when information has been withheld and 
this gives information providers an opportunity to withhold information they do not want 
consumers to have, knowing that those consumers are unlikely to punish them.    
Practical and Policy Implications 
In addition to our theoretical contributions, our research has practical implications that 
organizations and policy makers might consider. The analysis of whether disclosure improves 
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consumer welfare is complicated and the difficulty is aggravated when consumers have 
shifting preferences (Sunstein, 2018). If the goal is to increase human welfare, careful 
decisions must be made about what to disclose and what not to disclose.  
Some disclosures make consumers feel unhappy or unsatisfied, such as calories on 
restaurant menus (Thunström, 2019) or knowledge of the date of your partner’s death 
(Gigerenzer & Garcia-Retamero, 2017). But there is also the instrumental value of knowing 
certain information even if it makes you unhappy (Adler, 2012). For example, you might 
make better choices after knowing the result of a medical test.  
For the experiments in this paper (consumers researching profiles of doctors) and in 
other domains (buying a car or computer, going to a restaurant or deciding on a movie), it is 
likely that consumers are searching for information that is important and relevant to them to 
make a decision. In these cases, when relevant information disclosure is an important policy 
goal, voluntary disclosure is unlikely to be an adequate substitute for mandatory disclosure, 
even if the conditions for unraveling are met. If mandatory disclosure cannot be imposed, 
then some way of communicating that information has been deliberately withheld should be 
sought. Disclosure, therefore, may be effective not merely because of what is disclosed, but 
also by alerting consumers to the decisions of those who have chosen not to disclose. The 
latter goal can be achieved by giving providers the opportunity to disclose and informing 
consumers that this opportunity was provided and declined. The findings from our studies 
suggest that helping consumers become savvy by strongly framing non-disclosures may go 
some way toward achieving the same goal as mandatory disclosure, particularly if consumers 
can compare disclosures and non-disclosures in multiple providers. Finally, as with all policy 
proposals, we recommend testing in the field to see if the policy has the intended beneficial 
effect.    
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Conclusions 
Providers often have a choice about whether to disclose privately held information 
about the quality of their product or service. They can withhold information if the product or 
service quality is not good, but if they do, consumers may make inferences about the absence 
of information. Our findings, however, suggest that consumers are highly charitable 
regarding the absence of deliberately withheld information and only react negatively when 
non-disclosure is made highly salient, by either embedding non-disclosures among 
disclosures, or by emphasizing that the provider made a deliberate choice to conceal 
information. Given consumers’ strategically naïve and charitable attitude toward non-
disclosure, the most robust solution to protect and/or inform consumers is mandatory 
disclosure of crucial information.    
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Table 1a: Coding of reasons for why information is missing in Experiment 3 
Framing N  Non-deliberate N (%) 
Deliberate 
Other  
N (%) Irrelevant 
N (%) 
Partial unraveling  
N (%) 
Full unraveling 
N (%) 
Other 
deliberate 
N (%) 
Not 
Provided 355 68 (19) 50 (14) 261 (74) 0 (0) 10 (3) 11 (3) 
Declined 354 27 (8) 54 (15) 273 (77) 1 (0) 6 (2) 6 (2) 
Total 709 95 (13) 104 (15) 534 (75) 1 (0) 16 (2) 17 (2) 
 Kappa .98 .99 .98 1.00 .98 .99 
 
Note: One response can fall into multiple categories, and some participants received no code in any of these categories.  
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Table 1b: Examples for the categories of missing information reasons in Experiment 3 
 
 
  
Non-deliberate  
(not available, 
technical, forgot, 
costly) 
He seems like a capable doctor, perhaps he just forgot to put it on his profile 
There is not enough data to provide a rating. 
It could be just that he missed the filing date or something like that. 
The website might be new or maybe he's a younger doctor. 
Deliberate  
Irrelevant (unreliable, 
irrelevant, inaccurate, 
ambiguous or ‘right’ 
not to disclose) 
I think Doctor Green didn't really see the need to include the ratings. Maybe he doesn't think the ratings are accurately 
measured 
He did not feel that the ratings were a relevant reflection of his practice 
It is possible that he does not feel that they are accurately representative and wants people to decide for themselves 
Partial Unraveling  
(the information is 
bad) 
He might either have a low score or just an average one 
Possibly too low of a rating to talk about and rather just keep it private 
I find it very odd. It makes me think Doctor Green is hiding something 
It could be that he is unsatisfied with his rating and does not want people to judge him based on it 
Full Unraveling (the 
information is the 
worst possible) 
He probably has a rating of one  
Other deliberate  The doctor declined to provide the information  It could be deliberate 
STRATEGIC NON-DISCLOSURE   
 
63 
Table 2a: Coding of reasons to disclose trustworthiness and conflict of interest statements in Experiment 5 
Disclosed Trustworthiness N Strategic 
N (%) 
Naïve 
Inference 
N (%) 
Irrelevant  
N (%) 
Ethical  
N (%) 
Other  
N (%) 
No Low 81 1 (1) 64 (79) 15 (19) 0 (0) 3 (4) 
 Intermediate 41 0 (0) 35 (85) 7 (17) 2 (5) 2 (5) 
 High 13 0 (0) 5 (39) 4 (31) 2 (15) 3 (23) 
 Total 135 1 (1) 104 (77) 26 (19) 4 (3) 8 (6) 
Yes Low 31 10 (32) 4 (13) 1 (3) 14 (45) 4 (13) 
 Intermediate 49 11 (22) 23 (47) 0 (0) 15 (31) 3 (6) 
 High 95 7 (7) 73 (77) 0 (0) 12 (13) 8 (8) 
 Total 175 28 (16) 100 (57) 1 (1) 41 (23) 15 (9) 
 Total 310 29 (9) 204 (66) 27 (9) 45 (15) 23 (7) 
 Kappa  .98 .81 .84 .87  
        
Disclosed Conflict of Interest N Strategic  
N (%) 
Naïve 
Inference 
N (%) 
Irrelevant  
N (%) 
Ethical  
N (%) 
Other  
N (%) 
No Strong 75 0 (0) 62 (83) 12 (16) 3 (4) 4 (5) 
 Minor 54 0 (0) 34 (63) 31 (57) 2 (4) 1 (2) 
 None 47 0 (0) 11 (23) 34 (72) 1 (2) 4 (9) 
 Total 176 0 (0) 107 (61) 77 (44) 6 (3) 9 (5) 
Yes Strong 19 1 (5) 4 (21) 0 (0) 11 (58) 4 (21) 
 Minor 39 5 (13) 10 (26) 0 (0) 22 (56) 3 (8) 
 None 76 7 (9) 49 (65) 0 (0) 20 (26) 6 (8) 
 Total 134 13 (10) 63 (47) 0 (0) 53 (40) 13 (10) 
 Total 310 13 (4) 170 (55) 77 (25) 59 (19) 22 (7) 
 Kappa  .99 .81 .84 .87  
Note: One response can fall into multiple categories. 
STRATEGIC NON-DISCLOSURE   
 
64 
Table 2b: Examples for the categories of disclosure reasons in Experiment 5 
Strategic (rational 
disclosure / 
unraveling theory) 
If I had not included it, patients would be able to see a blank spot under Conflict of Interest Disclosure. It is better to disclose it than 
have patients think I'm hiding something. (Conflict of interest) 
If the heading is going to be there than might as well let them see it so they don’t think you are trying to hide something. (Conflict of 
interest) 
If I show the other two, but exclude that one, it will look untrustworthy and reaffirm my poor score. If it is hidden, people will 
probably assume it is even worse than it is. (Trust) 
Naïve Inference 
(if the information 
is good / bad) 
Because some patients might be turned off and think of me as a “drug pusher.” (Conflict of interest) 
I made that decision because I was afraid of the way that it would reflect upon me. (Conflict of interest) 
I would want people to know that a high percentage of patients thought I was trustworthy, to ease the mind of future patients. (Trust) 
The score sucks, a little more than half of the high end. I'm worried I would lose patients. (Trust) 
Irrelevant 
(unreliable, 
irrelevant, 
inaccurate or 
ambiguous) 
The information doesn’t seem relevant. (Conflict of interest) 
I didn’t think it would be relevant or helpful to someone look for potential doctors. (Conflict of interest) 
The rating could be skewed due to sample size. (Trust) 
I feel my trust is higher than a 70 rating. (Trust) 
Ethical  
(honest, fair, 
transparent) 
I believe that honesty is the best policy. (Conflict of interest) 
I think it's prudent and ethical for a doctor to list his conflicts of interests. (Conflict of interest) 
I want to be as transparent as possible. (Trust) 
I want to be completely transparent. People should have all the information they need to make an informed decision. (Trust) 
Other  
I think having it on my profile would make people think about it even though I don't have any conflict of interest. (Conflict of 
interest) 
Conflict of Interest to me gets patients thinking about what a conflict of interest might be. Since there is none, why even raise that 
question in people's minds? (Conflict of interest) 
Because I believe in being honest about things like that. It would come out anyway so why lie? (Conflict of interest) 
Telling everyone that I'm trustworthy makes me seem less trustworthy. It screams of desperation. (Trust) 
 
Note: In parentheses we indicate whether the reason was for the disclosure or non-disclosure of the Physician’s Conflict of Interest statement or 
Trust rating.   
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Table 2c: Coding of reasons to disclose trustworthiness and conflict of interest statements in Experiment 6 
Disclosed Trustworthiness N Strategic 
N (%) 
Naïve 
Inference 
N (%) 
Irrelevant  
N (%) 
Ethical  
N (%) 
Other  
N (%) 
No Low 22 1 (5) 18 (82) 5 (23) 0 (0) 1 (5) 
 High 6 0 (0) 4 (67) 3 (30) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
 Total 28 1 (4) 22 (79) 8 (29) 0 (0) 1 (4) 
Yes Low 4 0 (0) 1 (25) 0 (0) 3 (75) 2 (50) 
 High 24 3 (13) 18 (75) 0 (0) 3 (13) 2 (8) 
 Total 28 3 (11) 19 (68) 0 (0) 6 (21) 4 (14) 
 Total 56 4 (7) 41 (73) 8 (14) 6 (11) 5 (9) 
 Kappa  .98 .80 .95 .95  
        
Disclosed Conflict of Interest N Strategic 
N (%) 
Naïve 
Inference 
N (%) 
Irrelevant  
N (%) 
Ethical  
N (%) 
Other  
N (%) 
No Strong 17 0 (0) 15 (88) 5 (29) 0 (0) 2 (12) 
 None 11 0 (0) 4 (36) 8 (73) 1 (9) 1 (9) 
 Total 28 0 (0) 19 (68) 13 (46) 1 (4) 3 (11) 
Yes Strong 7 1 (14) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (86) 2 (29) 
 None 21 1 (5) 17 (81) 2 (10) 5 (24) 0 (0) 
 Total 28 2 (7) 17 (61) 2 (7) 11 (39) 2 (7) 
 Total 56 2 (4) 36 (64) 15 (27) 12 (21) 5 (9) 
 Kappa  .98 .77 .89 .88  
 
Note: One response can fall into multiple categories. 
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Figure 1: Stimuli in Experiment 1  
INSTRUCTIONS 
In a major US city, all doctors are rated by their patients on scales from 0 -100, where 0 is 
extremely poor, and 100 is outstanding. 
We contacted a large number of doctors and asked them to provide their average patient rating 
on five dimensions (quality of care, trustworthiness, availability, bedside manner and value for 
money). 
 
The combined ratings for all doctors in the survey are shown here.  
       
                   Quality of care provided      85 
 
                   Trustworthiness                   81 
 
                   Availability                         79 
 
                   Bedside manner                  82 
 
                   Value for money                 78 
In this study, we will show you the average ratings for a single doctor, who we will call Doctor 
Y.  
You will, however, only see four of Doctor Y's possible five ratings. 
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Figure 2. Average estimate of the missing dimension in Experiment 1 
 
Note: Error bars are ± 1 Standard Error (SE).  
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Figure 3. Likelihood of choosing Dr. Green in Experiment 2  
 
Note: Error bars are ± 1 SE. The dotted line indicates the unraveling prediction. 
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Figure 4. Likelihood of choosing Doctor X by condition in Experiment 4 
 
Note: Error bars are ± 1 SE. Only the “declined” high salience non-disclosure framing is 
equivalent to full disclosure.  
